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Abstract. It is practically impossible for users to memorize a large
portfolio of strong and individual passwords for their online accounts. A
solution is to generate passwords randomly and store them. Yet, stor-
ing passwords instead of memorizing them bears the risk of loss, e.g., in
situations where the device on which the passwords are stored is dam-
aged, lost, or stolen. This makes the creation of backups of the passwords
indispensable. However, placing such backups at secure locations to pro-
tect them as well from loss and unauthorized access and keeping them
up-to-date at the same time is an unsolved problem in practice.
We present PASCO, a backup solution for passwords that solves this
challenge. PASCO backups need not to be updated, even when the user’s
password portfolio is changed. PASCO backups can be revoked without
having physical access to them. This prevents password leakage, even
when a user loses control over a backup. Additionally, we show how to
extend PASCO to enable a fully controllable emergency access. It allows
a user to give someone else access to his passwords in urgent situations.
We also present a security evaluation and an implementation of PASCO.
1 Introduction
Online accounts are mainly protected by passwords. Services can imple-
ment password-based authentication with little effort and operate it with
a negligible cost per user [25]. Users are familiar with passwords and can
use them across many platforms, devices, and applications [6]. A password
kept in user’s mind appears to him to be always available, not threatened
by loss like a key, and to be stored in the safest place on earth to which no
one else has access and could steal it. Moreover, in emergency situations,
a user can give a password to someone else to access an account on his
behalf just by telling it. These perceived features of passwords are crucial
for users [30,44,53].
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But, passwords pose a fundamental challenge to users: To resist the
various known attacks against passwords [5,8,31,51,52], users need to se-
lect a strong and different password for each account. These two security
conditions require a large portfolio of strong and individual passwords to
be memorized, which is practically impossible for users [18,19,21].
One solution is to create passwords randomly and store them on a
user device, such as done by password managers [1,13,34]. However, this
approach bears the risk that the passwords get lost and has the drawback
that the passwords might not be available on all user devices [30]. Creating
a backup of the passwords as well as copying them to all devices manually
is burdensome and time-consuming, as it must be done after any change of
the users password portfolio. This happens frequently as it includes new
passwords and changing existing ones. Storing passwords in the cloud, for
synchronization and backup, bears the risk of server compromises [35],
security flaws [20,36,43,45,54], and governmental access [10]. Although
the passwords are encrypted, the security relies on a potentially weak,
user-chosen memorable password. There are also hybrid solutions, that
store some parts on a server and keep a strong invariable secret offline
on the devices. However, loss protection for the offline secret must be in
place meaning a secure and reliable backup solution is required. As well,
the provision of emergency access for such hybrid solutions is still an open
challenge, as the offline secret cannot be handed over easily or even worse,
might not be available to the user himself in such a situation.
In this paper, we advance the PasswordLess Password Synchroniza-
tion (PALPAS) scheme [26] with a secure and usable backup solution
called PASCO (PALPAS RECOVERY). It allows users to recover their
passwords in case their devices get lost. Additionally, our backup solution
can be used to establish fully controllable emergency access to the pass-
words. Once a backup is created, it never needs to be updated even when
the password portfolio changes. Therefore, it can be kept completely of-
fline in secure, different, and physical isolated locations which minimizes
the risk of compromise and loss. Furthermore, the backup solution has
an built-in revocation mechanism, which allows the user to completely
invalidate a backup if he loses control over it. The revocation mechanism
works without having access to the backup itself and guarantees that no
passwords can be leaked from it once revoked.
To the best of our knowledge, PALPAS is the most secure hybrid
password management solution currently available. It creates strong and
individual passwords for accounts and makes them available on all user
devices. PALPAS does not store passwords, neither on devices nor on
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servers. It generates them only when needed. This is done using a secret
stored on all devices and some synchronization data stored on a server.
The combination of PALPAS and PASCO is the first full-fledged so-
lution that ensures the confidentiality, availability, and recoverability of a
user’s password portfolio. Moreover, by integrating our backup revocation
mechanism directly into PALPAS, its security can further be increased.
This would enable the complete invalidation of PALPAS data stored on
a user device, for example in case the device is stolen.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we summarize related
work and we present the background about PALPAS in Section 3. We
describe PASCO in Section 4 and present its extension for emergency
access in Section 5. A security evaluation follows in Section 6 and we
present an implementation of PASCO in Section 7. We conclude the paper
in Section 8. Appendix A provides an alternative approach to guarantee
the availability of the data stored on the PALPAS synchronization server.
2 Related Work
In 2007, Floreˆncio and Herley [19] reported that users on average have 25
accounts. Due to the growth in online services, the number has strongly
increased over the last ten years, which makes the memorization of secure
passwords for all accounts practically impossible. Studies have shown that
users typically cope with this challenge by selecting passwords that are
easy to remember and reuse passwords across accounts [12,21,28,47,48,50].
This makes the passwords vulnerable to various attacks such as brute-
force [31,49,52], dictionary [5,51], and social engineering [8].
Beside many approaches to simplify the creation and memorization of
passwords [4,7,14,18,23,24,33,41,42], storing passwords on user devices is
the most common approach to solve the memorability problem. A promi-
nent example are password managers [1,13,34]. They store the user’s pass-
words in a database, encrypted with a user-chosen master password. To
synchronize the database between devices and prevent its loss, it is stored
on a server. In emergency situations, a user can give someone else the mas-
ter password, but then the person has access to all passwords. Moreover, a
security breach at the server [35] allows adversaries to steal the database
and to perform offline brute-force attacks [54]. This can be mitigated by
databases using honey encryption [9,29]. But, their design is challenging
[15,22] and a backup concept does not exist yet.
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Another approach is to only store data on servers that is independent
from the passwords, as done by PALPAS [26], which we use in this paper.
For a general model of such schemes we refer to Al Maqbali et al. [37].
Storing the passwords on multiple user devices instead of a server
does not serve as a proper backup concept because of the serious threat
of malware. Already in 2010, ZeuS showed how to compromise multiple
user devices even when they are not connected [17]. It infected the user’s
desktop computer and then tricked the user into installing the malware on
his mobile devices. Moreover, password backups on external hard drives
or network storage devices are also threatened by malware. For instance,
CryptoLocker encrypts files on these devices and holds them hostage un-
til the user pays a ransom [3,32]. Therefore, it is recommended to store
backups on read-only memories such as CDs and put them on secure, dif-
ferent, and physical isolated locations [16,46]. However, this is challenging
for users, because their password portfolio changes frequently. We tackle
these problems by using a secure element that is not required to be up-
dated at any time.
3 Background: PALPAS
Our work is based on PALPAS [26]. We start by explaining its function-
ality in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Then, we discuss the risk of password loss
in Section 3.3, for which we present a solution in Section 4.
3.1 Password generation
As illustrated in Figure 1, PALPAS generates a password for a user ac-
count in two steps: First, a (cryptographically secure) Pseudorandom
Generator (PRG) generates a random value based on a Seed and a Salt.
Second, a Password Generator (PG) derives a password from the random
value and ensures that it complies with a password policy (PP ). The
PRG and the PG are deterministic. Thus, using the same Seed, Salt,
and PP , the same password is generated.
PRG
Salt
Seed PGRandom Password
Password policy
Fig. 1: PALPAS password generation [26].
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The Seed is a randomly generated secret that is used for the genera-
tion of all passwords. It is created when a user uses PALPAS for the first
time and it does not change over time.
The Salt is also a random value, but it differs for each account so
that individual passwords for different accounts are created. Changing the
Salt for an existing account allows to create a new password, e.g., during
a regular password change. An initial salt is generated when PALPAS
initially creates the password for an account, e.g., during account creation.
The PP specifies the password requirements of a service such as the
password length and the allowed characters. By this, PALPAS ensures
that the randomly created password is actually accepted by the service.
The PP is created when a service is used for the first time. This can be
done manually by the user or the PP is retrieved from a central service
as presented by Horsch et al. [27]. During password change for an account
(by changing the salt) it might also be necessary to update the PP in
order to comply with the recent password requirements of a service.
3.2 Password synchronization
PALPAS creates a password portfolio of strong and individual passwords
for the user’s accounts using a fixed Seed and an individual Salt and
a PP for each service, respectively. To enable the computation of the
passwords on different devices, the Seed is shared by all user devices and
the salts and policies are synchronized between them through a server,
namely the Salt Synchronization Service (SSS).
When creating new or changing passwords, the corresponding salts
and policies are added or updated at the SSS. Each time PALPAS re-
computes a password, the corresponding Salt and PP for the account is
retrieved from the SSS. In this way, any changes of the user’s password
portfolio are immediately available on all of his devices.
Beside the salts and policies also the usernames of the user’s accounts
are synchronized between the devices through the SSS. For each user ac-
count A an account data object DataA = (SaltA, PPA, UsernameA, urlA)
is stored at the SSS, where urlA is the service’s URL. Each DataA is en-
crypted with a key KData,Enc by PALPAS before it is transferred to the
SSS. To retrieve only the DataA for a specific account and not all of
them, each DataA is associated with an identifier IDA. It is generated by
PALPAS by IDA = HMAC(KData,Mac, urlA), where urlA is the service’s
URL. Both keys, KData,Enc and KData,Mac, are derived from a key KData
which is randomly created when a user uses PALPAS for the first time.
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Moreover, the user’s account at the SSS is protected from unautho-
rized access. Each user device has an individual key pair KAuth for au-
thentication, consisting of a private key SKAuth and public key PKAuth.
The key pair is randomly created by the user device when PALPAS is
used for the first time and an account at the SSS is created. SKAuth is
stored on the device and PKAuth is transferred to the SSS.
To register multiple devices for an account at the SSS, an already
registered device needs to request an authentication token TAuth. The
new device creates its own key pair KAuth and uses TAuth to register
its PKAuth at the SSS. TAuth is randomly created by the SSS and has
a limited validity. All communication with the SSS is sent through a
mutually authenticated and secure channel, e.g. using TLS.
To set up PALPAS on all of his devices, a user needs to transfer the
PALPAS secret S = (Seed,KData) to each device and register the device
at the SSS using an authentication token. This has to be done only once.
The data transfer can be easily achieved by a file transfer or a QR code.
3.3 Password loss
The Seed, the salts, and the password policies are crucial for password
generation. To retrieve the account data from the SSS, SKAuth and KData
are required. The availability of these five pieces of data must be guaran-
teed. Otherwise, the user’s password portfolio is lost.
The account data is stored at the SSS. Their availability has to be
guaranteed by the SSS. We assume that the provider of the SSS imple-
ments proper measures to restore the data at any time. In case of cloud
storage providers, this can be realized with standard means like redun-
dant hardware and different data centers. As an alternative, we describe
a user-side solution using multiple SSSs in Appendix A.
The PALPAS secret S = (Seed,KData) and the individual SKAuth
are exclusively stored on user devices and thus are at high risk of loss.
Typical cases are lost, stolen, or damaged devices as well as malware.
4 PASCO
We now present PASCO (PALPAS RECOVERY), a secure and usable
backup solution for PALPAS. It ensures that users never lose their pass-
word portfolio by providing recoverability of the essential PALPAS data
that is stored on the user device.
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PASCO uses a separate backup device (BD) to store a backup of the
PALPAS data. We consider the BD to be a tamper resistant device that
provides secure storage, user authentication, and basic cryptographic al-
gorithms1. The BD stores the PALPAS secret S = (Seed,KData) en-
crypted by a one-time-pad (OTP) [2,38]. Furthermore, it has its own
authentication key pair KAuth,BD for the SSS. The BD is protected by a
user-chosen PIN. To prevent guessing attacks, it has a retry counter for
the PIN. After five wrong PIN entries the BD erases all stored data.
We explain the creation of the update-tolerant backup in Section 4.1
and how to restore the PALPAS data from a backup in Section 4.2. In
Section 4.3, we describe the built-in revocation mechanism for BDs, which
protects the user’s password portfolio from leakage, even when the user
loses control over a BD.
4.1 Creating a backup
We assume that the user already uses PALPAS and has registered a device
at the SSS. The procedure to create a PASCO backup is described in the
following. The data flow is illustrated in Figure 2.
1. The user (U) initializes the BD with a PIN.
2. The user device (UD) connects to the SSS, authenticates itself with
its SKAuth,UD, and requests TAuth,BD.
3. The UD sends S = (Seed,KData) and TAuth,BD to the BD.
4. The BD randomly samples a one-time-pad key OTPBD and computes
SBD = S ⊕ OTPBD. Then, it generates a key pair KAuth. SKAuth,BD
is stored at the BD and PKAuth,BD, TAuth,BD, and OTPBD is send to
the SSS. The SSS verifies TAuth,BD and stores PKAuth,BD and OTPBD.
Finally, BD stores SBD and deletes OTPBD and S.
Seed, KData, TAuth,BD
UD
UPIN
BD
SSS
TAuth,BD
PKAuth,BD, TAuth,BD, OTPBD
Fig. 2: Data flow of the PASCO backup procedure.
1 In Section 7 we present a implementation of PASCO using a smart card as a BD.
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An update of the BD is not necessary, even when the user’s password
portfolio is changed. Changing, adding, or deleting passwords only re-
quires to update, store, or delete the related DataA at the SSS. This is
already an integral part of PALPAS. As the SSS provides availability of
the account data, PASCO itself does not need to take care of it.
4.2 Restoring data from a backup
To restore the PALPAS data on a device, the user needs to have the BD,
the corresponding PIN, and a user device with PALPAS. The restoring
works as follows. The data flow is illustrated in Figure 3.
1. The user (U) authenticates himself to the BD with his PIN.
2. The BD contacts the SSS, authenticates itself with its SKAuth,BD, and
requests TAuth,UD and OTPBD.
3. The BD computes S = SBD ⊕ OTPBD. Then, it transfers the Seed,
KData, and TAuth,UD to the UD. The UD stores the Seed and KData.
4. The UD creates a key pair KAuth. SKAuth,UD is stored at the UD and
PKAuth,UD and TAuth,UD is send to the SSS. The SSS verifies TAuth,UD
and stores PKAuth,UD. UD has now access to the user’s account at the
SSS and can retrieve the account data for generating the passwords.
4.3 Revoking a backup
All existing BDs are registered at the SSS with their individual PKAuth,BD
and OTPBD. To revoke a BD a user deletes the related PKAuth,BD and
OTPBD at the SSS. Now the BD can no longer retrieve any account
data nor request new authentication tokens. Moreover, the deletion of
the OTPBD invalidates SBD and it is impossible to recover the PALPAS
secret S from the BD. Thus, the BD is useless and the passwords cannot
get leaked (see also Section 6). Our revocation solution based on a OTP
can also be integrated into PALPAS to securely revoke stolen user devices.
Seed, KData, TAuth,UD UD
UPIN
BD
SSS
TAuth,UD, OTPBD
PKAuth,UD, TAuth,UD
Fig. 3: Data flow of the PASCO restore procedure.
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5 PASCO backups with emergency access
Storing passwords on devices relieves users from memorizing their pass-
words. However, not knowing the passwords makes it impossible to give
someone else access to an account in urgent or emergency situations.
We now describe how a user can allow someone else to use a BD to
access his accounts. In Section 5.1, we extend PASCO to enable a fully
controllable emergency access. In Section 5.2, we describe the creation
and management of such a BD by the user. Particularly, we describe how
to control which accounts can be accessed with a specific BD. In Section
5.3, the procedure for an emergency access is explained.
5.1 Extending PASCO
In addition to storing the PALPAS data, the BD now implements the
PALPAS password generation procedure (cf. Section 3). Furthermore,
the SSS is equipped with a fine granular access control system for the
account data. For each PKAuth, a user can specify different access rules
to the account data. While, one PKAuth,BD may have access to all data,
another PKAuth,BD′ can only access the data for the user’s mail account.
5.2 Creating and managing a backup with emergency access
The procedure for creating a BD with emergency access is nearly the same
as described in Section 4.1. It only differs in the second step, where the
UD requests TAuth,BD. The request is supplemented by an access control
list (ACL), which is basically a list of account data identifiers (cf. Section
3.2). The PKAuth,BD registered using TAuth,BD is later only granted access
to the account data defined by the ACL. The ACL for each PKAuth can
be modified at any time. For instance, the user can enable the access to
his social media account during vacation and disable it afterwards. Both
can be done without having physical access to a BD. Moreover, a user
can also revoke a BD to invalidate it completely (cf. Section 4.3).
The BD can simultaneously act as a backup and password generation
device. Thus, depositing a single BD at a friend’s place is sufficient. To
provide both features, the BD is equipped with multiple authentication
keys. One PKAuth,BD is allowed to request an TAuth,UD as needed for the
restoring procedure (cf. Section 4.2). Another PK ′Auth,BD can only retrieve
certain account data and is used for the emergency access. To equip a BD
with multiple authentication keys, the aforementioned creation procedure
is performed multiple times with a different TAuth, PKAuth, ACL, and
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in particular a different PIN. Depending on the PIN, the BD uses the
corresponding PKAuth,BD for the authentication at the SSS. In accordance
with the ACL associated to PKAuth,BD, the SSS allows to request an TAuth
or only certain account data, e.g. DataA for the user’s mail account.
5.3 Accessing a backup in case of an emergency
We envision that a user has deposited a PASCO backup at a friend’s
place. Allowing the friend (i.e. BD holder) to create the user’s password
for an account works as follows. The data flow is depicted in Figure 4.
1. The user (U) tells the BD holder (H) the emergency PIN of the BD
and the URL of the service where H should access the user’s account.
2. H uses the PIN to authenticate himself to the BD and transfers the
URL of the service to the BD.
3. The BD connects to the SSS and authenticates itself with SKAuth,BD.
It calculates IDA for the URL and requests the corresponding DataA.
4. The SSS checks the ACL for PKAuth,BD and, if the access is allowed,
returns DataA and OTPBD.
5. The BD computes S = SBD ⊕ OTPBD and then decrypts DataA with
KData,Enc to obtain SaltA and PPA. Finally, it generates the password
using the Seed, SaltA, and PPA (cf. Section 3).
6. The BD deletes S and hands the password and username over to H.
H can now browse the service and log in to the user’s account.
H
PIN, URL
BD SSSDataA, OTPBDPassword,
Username
U PIN, URL
Fig. 4: Data flow of the PASCO emergency access procedure.
6 Security evaluation
A security evaluation of PALPAS can be found in [26]. In this section, we
focus on the security implications of the new features and additional data
stored at the SSS as introduced by PASCO. We consider the following
three scenarios: The theft/loss of a BD, a person with emergency access
becoming untrustworthy, and a security breach at the SSS. Throughout
the evaluation, we assume that the BD was securely created.
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Theft or loss of a BD In case of theft or loss, the BD is protected with
a PIN and a retry counter, which prevents a brute-force attack. As the
BD stores all data in a secure storage this provides a first line of defense.
Now we consider a stronger adversary, being capable to circumvent
the PIN protection and extract the data from a stolen BD, e.g., by timing
or side-channel attacks [40]. The adversary obtains SBD and SKAuth,BD.
However, SBD is one-time-pad encrypted and therefore statistically inde-
pendent from S as long as the adversary does not obtain the correspond-
ing key OTPBD. Given BD has been revoked in the meantime, SKAuth,BD
has been invalidated and the adversary cannot request any data or an au-
thentication token from the SSS. Moreover, OTPBD has been deleted and
it is impossible to reconstruct the PALPAS secret S from SBD. Thus,
the PIN only needs to protect the BD until it is revoked and gets useless.
There is no need for the user to change his passwords, the Seed, or KData.
Emergency access As long as the emergency PIN is not revealed to the
BD holder, the scenario is the same as in case of theft/loss. Revoking the
BD makes it useless. In case the PIN was revealed, the user can change
the BD’s access rights for the account data or revoke the BD completely.
A change of the revealed passwords ends access to the user’s accounts.
Security breach at the SSS Deviating from the original PALPAS, the
SSS additionally stores the OTPs used to encrypt the PALPAS secret on
the BDs. The OTPs are randomly sampled and statistically independent
from S. This means, an adversary learning the OTPs has no advantage
over an adversary analyzed for the original PALPAS scheme (cf. [26]).
Thus, PASCO does not decrease the security of PALPAS concerning a
security breach at the SSS.
7 Implementation
We now present an implementation of PASCO and in particular show the
realization of the BD using a smart card.
We used a Java card (NXP J3D081) and developed a Java Card Applet
(Classic Platform) that implements the backup and emergency feature.
The PALPAS data is stored in the secure memory of the card and is
protected by a PIN. The SSS was implemented as a Java Web Service
and a PALPAS/PASCO client as a Java desktop application. Due to the
restrictions of smart cards, the application and communication flows of
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our implementation slightly differ from the conceptual description. Nev-
ertheless, our realization fulfills the pursued security features. Namely,
it securely stores the PALPAS data and protects it from unauthorized
access and other threats like malware.
Authentication and communication Authentication at the SSS is realized
using TLS with mutual authentication. KAuth is a RSA key pair along
with a corresponding X.509 [11] certificate CAuth issued by the SSS. To
initially create an account at the SSS, a device creates KAuth and a Cer-
tificate Signing Request (CSR) [39]. The CSR is sent to the SSS which
in turn issues CAuth. Whenever another device is added to an account, a
CSR (containing PKAuth of the new device), TAuth and, in case a BD is
registered, a OTPBD is sent to the SSS. TAuth is realized as a random 32
bytes value with a validity period of 5 minutes.
The smart card and the SSS cannot communicate directly, because
of deviating communication protocols. Therefore, our PALPAS/PASCO
application acts as a proxy. During the restore and emergency procedure
it establishes a TLS channel to the SSS and a local connection to the BD.
The application forwards all messages between SSS and BD to hand over
OTPBD and to perform mutual authentication using CAuth and SKAuth
stored on the card. SKAuth does never leave the BD.
Password generation Other than in the conceptual description of the
emergency access function, the password generation is jointly done by the
BD and the PALPAS/PASCO application. The first part, the generation
of the random (cf. Figure 1), is done by the BD. After recovering the Seed
from SBD and OTPBD and decrypting the Salt and the PP , it computes
the random, and hands it together with the PP over to the application.
The second part is done by the application. It takes the random and
the PP and computes the password. The joint approach was necessary,
because the processing of the XML-encoded password policies as used by
PALPAS could not be realized on the card. Yet, this does not pose any
security issues, because the Seed and KData never leave the smart card.
8 Conclusion
Storing passwords on user devices is the most suitable approach to real-
ize both strong and individual passwords for user accounts. However, to
serve as a secure and usable solution, the confidentiality, availability, and
recoverability of the stored passwords must be ensured. The combination
of PALPAS and our PASCO provides the first solution that fulfills all
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these three requirements. With the implementation we have shown that
PASCO can be realized in practice with an off-the-shelf smart card.
We have also presented a revocation mechanism that could addition-
ally be integrated into PALPAS to enable the secure revocation of user
devices. With the emergency access, we address a major concern of users
regarding the storage of passwords. Moreover, this function can be used
to generate passwords in general. Storing the PALPAS data on a PIN-
protected smart card within its protected memory provides much more
security compared to encrypted storage on a user device. In particular
this is a major advantage in the mobile environment, which we will focus
in our future work. The smart card that we used has a contactless in-
terface and thus it is capable to communicate with NFC-enabled mobile
devices. Using the smart card as a password generator allows users to
literally have their passwords in their wallet. With the two key features
of PASCO, users need not update the card when their password portfolio
is changed and they are able to revoke it in case of loss at any time.
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A Recoverability of the SSS-side PALPAS data
PASCO provides recoverability of the PALPAS data stored on the user
device. In general, we assume that the recoverability of the account data
stored on the SSS is guaranteed by the SSS provider. An SSS provider
can realize this for example by using redundant hardware and multiple
data centers as depicted in Figure 5a.
However, for users that do not want to rely on this assumption, we now
describe an alternative approach to protect the server-side data from loss.
The basic approach is to redundantly store the account data on multiple
SSSs to mitigate the risk of loss, as illustrated in Figure 5b. Besides loss
protection, this also mitigates unavailability during a potential temporary
outage or maintenance of an SSS.
SSS UD
(a) SSS-side solution
UD
SSS1
SSS2
SSS3
(b) User-side solution
Fig. 5: Solutions for the recoverability of the SSS-side PALPAS data.
Storing the data on multiple SSSs can be realized with minor adaption
of the PALPAS client. Instead of storing the data on a single SSS, a user
device mirrors the account data to one or more additional SSSs.The com-
munication protocols and interfaces of the SSS providers need not to be
changed. The additional network traffic is negligible, because the account
data only make up for a few kilobytes. To efficiently create individual
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authentication and encryption keys for different SSSs, we propose a new
scheme to generate these keys. As well, we show how a one-time-pad key
can me masked in order to provide privacy protection.
In the current version of PALPAS KData and KAuth are randomly gen-
erated. Instead of applying these keys directly, we propose to use them as
input for a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to create SSS-specific encryp-
tion and authentication keys, respectively. In case PALPAS uses the OTP-
based revocation mechanism introduced by PASCO and when PASCO is
used with multiple SSSs, we propose to mask the OTP keys before storing
them on the SSSs. This approach has two advantages: First, it protects
the user’s privacy because keys are not reused. Otherwise, collaborating
SSS providers could identify users by comparing the authentication or
OTP keys. Second, it does not require to store a multitude of keys so it
can be realized on a smart card, where the storage capacity is very lim-
ited. Only a small random bit string needs to be additionally stored. In
detail, the generation of SSS-specific encryption and authentication keys
and the OTP masking work as follows.
SSS-specific encryption keys When a user uses PALPAS for the first time
KData is randomly created. But, PALPAS does not use the key directly, it
creates an SSS-specific key KData,SSS = KDF(KData, urlSSS) on demand
for each SSS, where urlSSS is the URL of the SSS. From KData,SSS an en-
cryption key KData,SSS,Enc and a message authentication key KData,SSS,Mac
can be derived as in the original PALPAS. For setting up PALPAS on
another device, the user just transfers KData to the new device as done in
the original version of PALPAS. The URLs of the SSSs can be included
in this transfer or manually entered.
SSS-specific authentication keys Each device still randomly creates its
KAuth, but does not use it directly for authentication. Instead, it creates
an SSS-specific authentication KAuth,SSS = KDF(KAuth, urlSSS) key for
each SSS, where urlSSS is the URL of the SSS. Note that in case of setting
up PALPAS on a new device, the registered device needs to request a
TAuth,SSS from each SSS. The tokens can be transferred together with the
URLs of the SSSs, the Seed, and KData by a file transfer or a QR code.
SSS-specific OTP key masking When setting up a new device, PALPAS
samples a random bitmask M in addition to the one-time-pad key OTPUD
that is used to encrypt the PALPAS secret on the device. Then, it creates
a SSS-specific bitmask MSSS = PRG(M,urlSSS), where urlSSS is the URL
of the SSS and PRG a secure pseudorandom generator. Note that the URL
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of the SSS must be available to the devices anyway, because it is required
for the registration/setup procedure at the SSS. Instead of OTPUD (cf.
Step 4, Section 4.1), the UD sends OTPUD,SSS = OTPBD ⊕ MSSS to
the SSS. M is stored on the user device while MSSS is recomputed when
required to recover OTPUD from OTPUD,SSS. With respect to PASCO,
the procedure is the same to create a BD supporting multiple SSSs.
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